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This paper presents an approach to the reliability and 
availability of Vessel Traffic Management and Information Systems 
through the analysis of hardware, software and human reliability. 
The paper analyzes the critical subsystems and modules on the 
basis of the reliability theory, in order to achieve and ensure 
the availability of systems, i.e. to increase the safety of maritime 
traffic and the protection of the sea and marine environment. 
The paper discusses some of the techniques and mechanisms of 
hardware and software redundancy, as well as the activities that 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computers and all their associated equipment present the 
technical foundation of modern information and communication 
systems. Computer technology is experiencing a rapid 
development geared towards the increasing miniaturization and 
mobility, increasing processing speed, increasing capacity of the 
main and secondary memory. This development is also geared 
towards the use of all media designed for receiving and storing 
data, greater compatibility, continuous price cuts, etc. The size 
and complexity of computer systems have dramatically increased 
in the last decade and the trend is likely to continue in the future. 
Contemporary examples of complex computer systems can be 
found in all sectors of economy, in all maritime systems, as well as 
onboard ships and in supervising, managing and organizing the 
maritime transport.
In order to improve the safety and efficiency of maritime 
transport and the protection of the sea and marine environment, 
it is inevitable to use modern information and communication 
technologies when collecting, storing, processing, presenting 
and distributing relevant data and information to the participants 
in maritime transport. These are the essential characteristics of 
the system called Vessel Traffic Management and Information 
System - VTMIS.
A common structure of the VTMIS system consists of the 
VTMIS functions and VTMIS subsystems. VTMIS functions are 
grouped into operational and complementary roles, while VTMIS 
subsystems include sensors (a marine radar subsystem and 
the automatic identification subsystem), communication and 
computer networks, operator consoles, servers, databases, video 
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A VTMIS system is based on a client-server architecture, 
where the server provides services to a client whose work at the 
computer is most of the time disconnected from the server. The 
client-server architecture provides a clear separation between 
the server and client processes and their autonomy.
The distributed database is a relational database that is not 
entirely situated on just one server (SQL Server – Structured Query 
Language). SQL servers are based on a client-server concept with 
highly standardized application interface, defined by the SQL 
standards and communication standards with databases known 
under the abbreviation ODBC (Open Data Base Connectivity).
VTMIS systems include hardware and software, and 
they include the man as an important participant. Hence, it is 
necessary to analyze the reliability of all these system elements.
Generally speaking, a computer system failure can be 
caused by hardware failure, software failure, human error, or by 
variables from the environment (fire, power failure, lightning, etc.). 
Unlike hardware failures that have been extensively analyzed, 
along with various techniques and mechanisms for their solving, 
software failures and failures caused by the man followed 
by an adequate analysis of reliability and availability, did not 
attract much attention during the research and development 
of professional systems. However, as the implementation of 
computer systems grew, the analysis and study of the software 
and man-induced failures gained impetus, especially when it 
became evident that the computer system failure occurs mostly 
due to software failure resulting from the operator’s error. In 
addition, it was considered for a long time that the concept of 
reliability and failure rate can not apply to software because the 
latter cannot be physically degraded over time and because 
of stressful environmental influences. Practice has shown that 
such considerations were wrong. In many applications, there are 
serious consequences caused by errors or software failures that 
result in huge economic losses and/or loss of human life (e.g. 
sinking of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield by the Argentine 
Air Force in the Falklands War in 1982; the aircraft crashing 
into a mountain in Antarctica because of computer errors in 
determining flight coordinates).
The development of information technology enables the 
development, implementation and use of increasingly complex 
computer systems in off-line and on-line applications. All these 
applications require that the operation of hardware and software 
should be failure-free, i.e. that computers work without error 
or fault. In this regard, IT companies have begun to design, 
deploy and use computer systems that are tolerant to failures. 
Failure tolerance is one of the techniques to achieve the target 
reliability of a computer system. Other techniques include: 
avoiding failures (preventing the occurrence or introduction of 
faults), troubleshooting (reducing the number or the magnitude 
of faults), and dodging the issue (predicting / estimating the 
malfunction and its consequences if it occurs). 
The reliability theory shows that fault tolerance can be 
achieved by using redundancy, which can be: hardware, software, 
information and time redundancy. Hardware and software 
redundancy are carried out by multiplication of hardware and 
software at all levels of complexity. Information redundancy 
is adding bits to data, which enables the detection and/or 
correction of errors. The codes of parity represent the simplest 
form of information redundancy. Time redundancy implies the 
repetition of certain operations during program performance. 
In addition, the systems tolerant to failures are often designed 
using reconfiguration strategy. Reconfiguration strategy can 
be implemented in various ways, including logical or physical 
removal of faulty elements. The techniques that are used to 
identify faulty elements and methods that are used to fix the 
system are quite different and may lead to complex reliability 
models.
There are two basic strategies of reconfiguration: 
degradation and replacement with a grain of salt. Methods of 
degradation include the continuous removal of faulty elements 
without repair. A reconfigured system continues to operate 
with reduced elements. The other method implies removing 
faulty elements and their replacement with the correct ones, 
or repairing the defective element; see (Tomas, 2004; Kirrmann, 
2005; Shooman, 2002).
2. AVAILABILITY OF VTMIS SYSTEMS
In the national and international scientific and technical 
literature there has been a growing interest of computer 
companies in expressing the quality of their products through 
their reliability, availability, safety, integrity and functional 
suitability. The number and types of quality indicators depend on 
the complexity of the information system.
The VTMIS system reliability is defined as the probability 
that the system will function without failure during a specific 
period of time under certain conditions. In other words, it is the 
probability that the failure time T will occur after the observed 
time t. Reliability is a complex feature and is an indicator of 
quality. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is the most common 
indicator of quality.
Availability is defined as the probability that a system will 
be available at any point in time, i.e. that it will be able to work 
or to get started, provided it is used under specific conditions. 
walls, system software, application software and web services. VTMIS 
systems are flexible, open and have modular architectures that 
allow upgrading using standard computer and communication 
components. In other words, a VTMIS system is a distributed 
architecture which is: distributed, decentralized, networking, multi-
layered, hierarchical and open. 
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Availability may be defined in various ways: it may be defined 
by the manufacturer (inherent availability - Ai) and, on the other 
hand, as the operational availability (Ao) (Pokorni, 2002).
The inherent availability can be calculated with the aid of 
the relation:
Where: MTBF is Mean Time Between Failure and MTTR is 
Mean Time To Failure.
The operational availability can be calculated by using the 
relation:
Where: tur is the total or average time in the operational 
work and tuo is the total or average time of failure.
The relation (1) shows that an increased availability can 
be achieved by higher MTBF (higher reliability) or lower MTTR. 
A higher MTBF is achieved by higher reliability of the elements 
that are installed in the computers (servers), but also through 
redundancy. In computer systems, the MTTR is, in fact, the mean 
time to the restoration of service, rather than the mean time to 
repair or replace faulty modules, and the restoration of services 
includes the following activities: detection of failure / error, 
reporting the problem, communication between the operator 
and his own maintenance service or the technical service 
provided by the system manufacturer, repairing / replacement, 
restarting the computer system.
MTTR for critical modules of the VTMIS system ranges from 
2 to 4 hours, while with non-critical modules it lasts between 
24 to 48 hours. Relying to our own experience and technical 
literature, MTTR can be reduced down to 50% if the user of a 
VTMIS system is supported by trained and skilled personnel 
for maintaining computer equipment, if he/she has necessary 
maintenance equipment and a number of critical spare modules.
On the basis of our own data (Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence system) and data gathered 
from the literature (Struk, 2012), the availability of computers in 
different architectures is presented in Table 1.
Availability Failure Example
90 % > 1 month Unattended PC
99 % ~ 3 days 16 hours Maintained PC
99,9 % ~ 9 h Cluster
99.99 % ~ 57 min Mainframe
99.999 % ~ 5 min Onboard computer to the PC platform
999.999 % ~ 30 s Installed on a dedicated PC platform
In the Resolution A.915 (220 Ref.40) the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) defines the availability as “the 
probability that the system provides a needed service under the 
specified conditions. Unavailability can be caused by the planned 
and / or unforeseen interruption”. International Association of 
Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) 
recommends three availability levels: basic, standard and target 
(advanced) (IALA Recommendation V-128 Edition 3.0: Operational 
and Technical Performance  Requirements for VTS Equipment, 
2007).
Companies that produce VTMIS systems adhere to the IALA 
recommendations and launch into the market VTMIS systems 
that are configured to provide availability of 99.9%, which 
means that a subsystem or the system as a whole is not available 
approximately 9 hours per year; see (Norcontrol IT AS – Vessel 
Traffic Management & Information System – VTMIS 5060, 2006; 
CoastWatch VTMIS, 2012).






A0 [%] =                  . 100
Table 1.
Availability and the time of failure of computers in the course of one year.
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In the simplest case, where a failure of any hardware, 
software, or man / operator leads to a system failure (block 
diagram of the three elements connected in series), and provided 
that their failures are independent, the reliability of such a system 
is obtained by the relation (Shooman, 2002):
where:
• RS – system reliability,
• RH – hardware reliability,
• RSF – software reliability, and
• RO – operator reliability.
In VTMIS systems using virtual private networks (VPN), 
based on TCP / IP technology, it should be taken into account 
that the system failure or system availability reduction may occur 
due to the channel failure, network congestion, viruses or attacks 
referring to rejection of services etc. According to (Hussain, 
2005), there may be various reasons for communication network 
failure: in 32% of cases the failure is due to the connecting 
paths (links), 25% because of the directors, 36% resulting from 
maintaining and configuring the network, and 9% due to other 
communication problems.
In order to increase availability, almost all manufacturers of 
VTMIS systems install self checking devices in their subsystems. 
Checks performed during the operation (functional control) 
continuously monitor the operation of the subsystems to 
detect errors in the software, hardware faults or mistakes made 
by the operator. Checks performed out of the operational 
work (functional testing) are done with the aim of finding the 
components that are broken and need to be repaired / replaced. 
This inspection is carried out by the maintenance personnel (own 
maintenance, dealers or service agents authorized by the system 
manufacturer).
Functional monitoring generates two types of warnings 
that are displayed and logged into a separate file (log file):
• system’s response – if the operator, during normal 
operation, enters a wrong command or inadequate information 
in certain forms, the system responds by generating an adequate 
warning;
• technical warning – if the functional monitoring diagnoses 
a failure / error in a module, the subsystem’s technical console 
receives an adequate warning.
A detailed analysis of the reliability and availability of the 
elements of the VTMIS system is presented in the following 
chapters.
3. RELIABILITY OF HARDWARE IN VTMIS SYSTEMS 
VTMIS systems feature a great variety of subsystems, 
consisting of a large number of hardware modules. This method 
of designing a system provides great advantages with regard to 
redundancy, maintenance and training.
Simple and complex hardware modules that are installed 
in all control centers and sensors feature an open architecture 
design in order to meet the new requirements. In control centers 
the main (critical) modules are VTS server (Track Management 
Server), SQL server and LAN (Local Area Network) networks. 
In sensor subsystems, the main modules (transmitters, radar 
extractor, pointing elements...) are under the direct control of the 
microprocessor. All modules are usually characterized by the so-
called failure rate (λ), a general relation for hardware reliability R 
(t) being:
Formula (4) is the first law of reliability, which is used to 
determine of reliability when is a known function of the failure 
rate. When the failure rate does not change over time, i.e. λ = 
const, the formula for reliability takes the form:
(4.1)
(3)RS = RH . RSF . RO
RH (t) = e
-λt
(4)RH (t) = e




Availability of radar subsystems as recommended by IALA.
Availability of radar subsystems
Levels of availability
Basic Standard Advanced
Recommended availability for 
radar subsystems 99 % 99.6 % 99.9 %
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Formula (4.1) is called the exponential law of reliability. If 
the failure rate in the formula (4.1) is expressed in the unit (1/h), 
then the time should be included in hours (h). Formula (4.1) is 
valid for the second period (the period of normal use) as shown 
in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that there are three characteristic periods 
within the hardware failure rate: the early failure period, the 
period of normal use and the period of aging (wear).
In professional systems, such as VTMIS systems, the early 
failure period (the period of childhood diseases) is conducted by 
the manufacturer of the system (except for the failures that occur 
during transport, transfer or installation of the system). At the 
beginning of the third period, when components are subject to 
aging and wear, the systems are removed from service for safety 
reasons because of major material / financial losses that may 
result from their failure, or due to high maintenance costs.
Reliability indicators are normally used in the second 
period, i.e. during normal operation. This period is the longest 
and for personal computer systems may range from 2 to 5 years.
Computer technology provides four ways to ensure the 
reliability of hardware: through installing reliable elements (CPU, 
RAM, disk drives, etc.), designing the systems in such a way that the 
failure of an individual module cannot lead to the breakdown of 
the entire system; purchasing the elements from multiple sources; 
and installation of redundant elements allowing fast switching to 
a secondary or redundant element.
Each module whose failure may reduce the system’s 
availability must have its redundant module. Almost all 
manufacturers of VTMIS systems use the classical form of 
redundancy for critical modules. This form includes two identical 
components connected in parallel, where both modules 
perform the same functions, and each is capable of functioning 
independently in the system. Both modules are connected to the 
mechanism for automatically switching from the primary module 
to the secondary one in case of failure. The secondary module 
can function in the following conditions: cold standby reserve, hot 
standby reserve and fault-tolerant operation.
VTMIS subsystems use the fault-tolerant operation 
which means the extension of hot reserve, since the secondary 
module operates as a “mirror” of the primary module. Both 
modules handle the same data, so that there is no loss of data 
or information in case of failure of the primary and switching to 
the secondary module. In addition, each module has a built-in 
ability to detect errors. Therefore, adding just one module can be 
sufficient to achieve the desired reliability. Additional hardware 
resource management allows the computer system to increase 
its ability to continue operating.
Figure 2 shows the schematic presentation of a redundant 
radar transmitter. In addition to the radar transmitter, the radar 
extractor and microprocessors may be duplicated in some 
configurations to improve reliability.
In control centers of the VTMIS systems, critical redundant 
modules include: VTS server, database server (SQL server) and 
LAN networks; see (Norcontrol IT AS – Vessel Traffic Management 
& Information System – VTMIS 5060, 2006; CoastWatch VTMIS, 
2012).
All computer equipment in VTMIS subsystems is connected 
to devices for uninterruptible power supply (UPS), with the 
provision that in the event of a prolonged interruption of power 
a diesel generator cuts in. This form of redundancy is ensured 
because power failures make 26% of total failures in computer 
systems.
There are several mechanisms for monitoring hardware 
modules. The simplest way is to monitor functional safety and it 
involves checking the hardware modules with the aid of other 
Figure 1.
Failure intensity of hardware elements
Figure 2.
Redundancy in radar subsystems.
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Such a division of VTMIS software systems into systemic 
functions makes the software consistent, effective, reliable, and 
easy to understand, maintain and upgrade.
Ensuring a high reliability of the software depends on 
the parameters of the software quality in each stage of the 
development cycle. Each stage requires parameters used to 
measure the quality characteristics. The IEEE 982.2. standard 
defines in detail the characteristics of each stage, with particular 
attention paid to: user requirements, design, implementation and 
testing (IEEE Std. 982.2.-1988: IEEE Guide for the Use of Standard 
Dictionary of Measures to Produce Reliable Software, 1988).
The assessment of the reliability of software is done using 
various measures (Jiantao, 1999): the finished product value 
(referring to the complexity of the software, i.e. the number of 
lines of the software code), project management value (referring 
to the relationship between the development process and the 
project feasibility in a defined period of time and at acceptable 
quality level), software development process (referring to the 
measures taken to produce a quality software), error and failure 
ratio (referring to the MTBF and reliability of the software 
calculated on the basis of information on errors obtained from 
users), and reliability requirement factor (which implies that the 
specification of user requirements cannot contain ambiguous 
phrases, requests with multiple meanings, and the like).
According to ANSI, the software reliability is defined as 
the probability of a successful software operation over a period 
of time in a particular environment. In other words, software 
reliability is a function of a successful software operation 
dependent on the time and the environment:
where:
• rbo – operation without failure,
• so – specific environment, and
• ov – specified time.
The evaluation of reliability and the hardware reliability 
itself are based on the analysis of failure, i.e. software errors 
and their impact on the overall system. Software error may be 
the result of errors in the code, misuse, misinterpretation of 
specifications that the software should satisfy (incompetence 
of programmers), the application of inappropriate tests or other 
unforeseen problems.
(5)RSF = f ( rbo, so, ov )
operating system functions, data management, functional 
monitoring and functional verification.
hardware modules and using test programs. The performance of 
test programs does not affect normal functions of the software. 
When functional monitoring detects an error, a warning is sent to 
the technical service console and is recorded in the log file.
In order to further increase the availability of the VTMIS 
system, i.e. the availability of control centers, the hardware and 
software of all consoles are configured to perform the same 
functions, which means that the failure of one operator console 
will not affect the other.
In order to increase the reliability of the VTMIS system, 
nominal environmental conditions must be met: atmospheric 
pressure of 1024 hPa, relative humidity of 70%, rainfall at 5 
mm/hr, air temperature 25oC, sea temperature 18oC, salinity of 
35% and sea state up to 3.
Redundant modules have proved to be the best solution for 
improving the overall availability of subsystems and the VTMIS 
system as a whole. Installing the most trusted module can be a 
more expensive and less reliable solution than installing the two 
cheaper and less reliable modules that operate in parallel with 
negligible time of switching and restarting.
4. RELIABILITY OF SOFTWARE IN VTMIS SYSTEMS 
As a result of the increasingly important role of software in 
professional systems, including VTMIS systems, software errors 
have a significant share in the total number of failures. This, in 
turn, has forced professional system manufacturers to pay more 
attention to the software reliability and availability, i.e. to the 
overall quality of their systems.
VTMIS software system is based on common modules that 
are harmonized with the functions. These “modules” are called 
systemic functions because each systemic function performs 
one of the many functions that the systemic software should do. 
The rest of the modules (programs) in the VTMIS system, i.e. the 
utility tools, are not essential for the operational reliability of the 
system.
Depending on the VTMIS manufacturer, the systemic 
functions are grouped into several categories. Here is one of the 
possible categorizations:
• systemic application functions - are functions that perform 
the functional requirements of operators;
• systemic functions for sensor control – are functions for 
handling the sensors for data acquisition and basic information 
processing;
• systemic communication functions – are functions ensuring 
the interaction with the operator, the communication within 
each subsystem and for communication between subsystems;
• auxiliary systemic functions – are used by other functions to 
fulfill their tasks;
• basic systemic functions – are functions without which 
the other systemic features could not work; they include the 
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Comparing the hardware failure rate curve (Figure 1) and 
the software failure rate (Figure 3), two main differences can be 
noticed:
• during aging (wear) there is no increased error intensity, 
nor decreased reliability, because software does not require 
updating;
• the software failure rate during normal use features a 
number of peaks indicating an increasing number of failures due 
to upgrades (updates) of the systemic or user software, as it is 
likely to make mistakes during the process.
Similar to VTMIS hardware systems, many techniques that 
are designed for detection and fault tolerance can be applied 
to the software. Redundant software can be implemented in 
multiple forms, and it is not necessary to replicate the entire 
modules to obtain redundancy. Software redundancy can 
be achieved by using additional parts of programs (from 
using several software modules to the use of programming 
procedures), or through additional data storage, where several 
software support tools may be used.
The simplest mechanism for checking software is the 
use of time clocks or monitoring clocks (programmable timers, 
counters that normally reset the programs that are being 
executed before reaching zero when counting backwards). If the 
program is terminated due to an error, the countdown timers will 
not be reset on time, and functional control will send a technical 
warning to the service console and enter it in the log file.
In order to increase the availability of software subsystems, 
there has been an increased use of software agents, i.e. systems 
for automatic installation and configuration of software 
support modules on remote PCs. Software agents can perform 
the installation of operating systems or modules of systemic 
functions. The RMS (Remote Maintenance Stell) is such an 
example. The RMS system allows fully automated remote 
management of software support on a large number of nodes 
in the IP network.
In the beginning of modern VTMIS system development, 
the operating systems Windows NT, Windows 2000 and 
Windows XP were used. Today, Microsoft operating systems are 
increasingly replaced with open source solutions (UNIX, Linux, 
etc.), in particular for server applications.
5. RELIABILITY OF MAN
At the dawn of development of complex technical systems, 
the manufacturers of computer systems usually determined the 
reliability of their system by taking into account only the reliability 
of the hardware (and later, the reliability of the software). From 
the practical point of view, the reliability defined in such a way 
presents just approximate information about the reliability of the 
system where a man inevitably takes part. The first attempts to 
determine the reliability of man assumed the application of the 
same concepts and methods that were used by the hardware 
reliability theory, considering the man / operator as a separate 
element of the system. Thus, it was possible to form the function 
of operator errors analogous to the function of the hardware 
failure rate. When the operator starts working (not being familiar 
with the current state of maritime traffic), the number of errors 
is usually high, to be soon reduced and become relatively small 
and approximately constant. After a while, the number of errors 
increases due to fatigue. The human error rate curve is analogous 
to hardware failure rate (Figure 1). The only difference lies in the 
observation period: for the hardware it is equal to the time of use 
(for a PC 2 to 5 years), and for humans the observation period 
covers an operator’s shift or working hours.
Significant factors affecting the reliability of the human 
being are: stress, time, training, conditions (ergonomics), 
procedures, etc.
Man, as part of the system, may take a number of roles that 
directly or indirectly affect the availability of the system. In VTMIS 
systems, man can take the role of a VTS operator, VTS supervisor, 
VTS instructor, VTS manager, he/she may become a service 
provider (maintenance) or a service user.
IALA Recommendation V-103, entitled “Standards for 
Training and Certification of VTS Personnel”, provides a set of 
requirements for courses and standards for certification of VTS 
personnel. A VTS operator must hold a certificate that includes 
the provision of information services, provision of navigation 
assistance and traffic organization services, and – if necessary – 
a VTS supervisor license (Recommendation V-103 Standards for 
Training and Certification of VTS Personnel, 2009).
Each VTS center should ensure a detailed VTS operator’s job 
description that is in line with the provided services, equipment 
and coordination with other participants in maritime traffic.
For VTS personnel educational purposes a simulation 
function is used. The function should be in accordance with the 
IALA V-103 recommendations. Simulated maritime vessels move 
in line with the pre-programmed trajectories that are similar to 
those used for showing the movement of objects. On simulated 
Figure 3.
The function of the failure rate of software.
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In order to increase the reliability of VTS operators, it is 
necessary to develop the ability of simultaneous acting which 
implies the human activity involving the simultaneous receiving 
and processing information from multiple independent sources 
or the simultaneous performance of two or more tasks. The term 
“simultaneous” should not be taken literally (parallel processing 
of information), but rather in a broader sense as a fast switching 
of focus from one task to another.
Problems that affect the reduced reliability of operators 
include:
• arm muscle strain – which largely depends on the design of 
the keyboard, mouse or control surface; strain of other muscles of 
the body (general fatigue and pain in the lower back) depends on 
the design of operator and service console;
• visual comfort in using the console monitors – is related to 
the features of the characters and the background on the console 
monitor and video terminals (size, contrast, brightness and color); 
in addition, the visual comfort is affected by monitor resolution, 
monitor size and speed of exchanging letters;
• ergonomic design of interfaces – the interface should allow 
the operator to focus on the task to be performed and be done 
in an intuitive way, the user’s interface is actually a window 
providing a view into the application.
It is obvious that man as a part of the system can increase 
the reliability of the system, but also reduce it if his/her reliability 
is low. Therefore, the reliability of the man in VTMIS systems 
should be taken into careful consideration. There are human 
reliability models that have been designed specifically to serve 
the purpose.
6. CONCLUSION
Safe navigation of vessels is increasingly required in 
today’s global maritime transport, especially in the control and 
organization of maritime transport. This is achieved through 
reliable operation of information and communication systems 
that provide timely, accurate and reliable data and information 
to the master and other participants in the maritime traffic. Low 
reliability and availability result in endangered safety of the ship, 
master’s dissatisfaction (due to undelivered goods or services) 
and lead to pollution of the sea and marine environment. These 
consequences generate considerable material and financial 
losses. The reliability and availability of a VTMIS system must be 
calculated by taking into account the reliability of the hardware, 
the reliability of the software (as there is no component of the 
system which does not feature a built-in software), but also 
the reliability of the man / operator, particularly in supervision 
systems where human component takes part in all operations.
All manufacturers of VTMIS systems can achieve the 
availability of at least 99.9% for devices, subsystems and the 
system as a whole by combining hardware, software, information 
and time redundancy. The introduction of redundancy leads to 
complex and expensive configurations of the subsystems. For 
this reason, the designers and users of professional systems 
including VTMIS systems introduce redundancy only into the 
modules that are critical for the system, i.e. into the modules that 
require an extremely high level of reliability and availability, such 
as the VTS server and SQL server.
An increased availability of VTMIS systems inevitably 
implies investment in VTS human resources. The personnel 
engaged should have IT knowledge, hold VTS certificates, be able 
to act simultaneously, and be trained to perform all procedures 
and critical events with the aid of the simulator which is in 
compliance with the IALA V-103 recommendations.
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